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America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, 
Officer Education, and Victory in World War 
II. By Peter J. Schifferle. Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2010. xi + 295 pp. Photographs, 
notes, bibliography, index. $39.95. 
In America's School for War, Peter J. Schifferle 
examines the role of professional military edu-
cation at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, notably 
through the Command and General Staff 
College (CGSC), in preparing officers for likely 
responsibilities as staff officers and leaders in 
future wars. Focusing on the period between 
the two world wars, he emphasizes continuity 
in thinking and doctrine and, related to both, 
in the rationale for the curriculum at CGSc. 
Whatever the number of students (which 
expanded as U.S. involvement in World War 
II loomed) or the structure of the curriculum 
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(which went from two years to one in length), 
the cultivation of officers' competence to enable 
them to bring together the wherewithal to con-
duct warfare quickly and decisively, as well as to 
impart an appreciation for elements of leader-
ship and command, was consistently central. 
Unlike many earlier historians, Schifferle 
emphasizes the continuity of Americans' expe-
rience in World War I and their thinking and 
training afterward. In fact, he claims, "The 
most significant, and frequently overlooked, 
conclusion is the overwhelming influence that 
World War I had on the interwar army officers." 
This pervasive influence becomes an essential 
element of his comprehensive argument, since 
only some officers serving during World War 
II had Leavenworth schooling, and Schifferle 
needs to explain the general success of the 
Army's officer corps by other means as well. In 
addition to formal schooling at Leavenworth, 
Schifferle credits the success to various offi-
cers' actual experience in World War I, how 
they perceived their profession and the need to 
master skills, and their expectations concern-
ing future war, including an awareness of the 
interplay of "penetration" (Blitzkrieg to the 
Germans) and positional warfare along with 
the essential nature of combined arms coordi-
nation. 
One of the most lively sections, late in 
the work, features Major General Ernest N. 
Harmon during the German offensive in the 
Ardennes late in 1944. Schifferle convinc-
ingly shows Harmon to have been quick, clear, 
and effective in helping to blunt and reverse 
the Germans. But as evidence of the effec-
tiveness of professional military education at 
Leavenworth, this is ultimately only anecdotal. 
His explanation of Leavenworth's influence as 
part of a composite leaves no sure way to deter-
mine the weight of each element. 
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